News & insights
Marleen van den Horst
Attorney at Law
NL District Court grants cross-border injunction against MSD despite parallel foreign invalidity proceedings
On 7 October 2026, the District Court of The Hague (the “Court”) handed down its decision in proceedings between Merck Sharp & Dohme B.V. (“MSD”) and Halozyme Inc. (“Halozyme”) concerning Halozyme’s EP 2 797 622 B1 (“EP 622”) for modified PH20 polypeptide variants. The Court rejected MSD’s invalidity and non-infringement arguments. It held that MSD’s subcutaneous formulation of the API pembrolizumab, marketed as Keytruda (“Keytruda SC”), containing the hyaluronidase enzyme berahyaluronidase alfa (“ALT-B4”), infringes EP 622. The Court granted Halozyme cross-border injunctions for the Dutch, Belgian, Danish, French, Irish, Italian, Swedish and Swiss parts of EP 622, subject to the condition that the respective foreign part of EP 622 remains valid.
What preceded
EP 622 claims modified PH20 polypeptides meeting specified sequence and functional requirements, including increased stability in the presence of phenolic preservatives. PH20 hyaluronidase temporarily increases tissue permeability and enables medicines that were previously administered intravenously to be administered subcutaneously. MSD developed Keytruda SC, a subcutaneous formulation containing pembrolizumab as active substance and ALT-B4.
MSD requested a declaration of non-infringement and revocation of the Dutch part of EP 622. Halozyme counterclaimed for declarations of infringement and injunctions regarding the Dutch and, cross-border, seven foreign parts of EP 622, including an injunction for unlawfully facilitating infringement by its group companies.
Claim construction and validity
The Court construed claim 1 as a product claim with functional features. Therefore, the relevant phenol-stability test had to be performed on the modified PH20 polypeptide as such, not on the final Keytruda SC formulation. It was irrelevant that Keytruda SC itself does not contain a phenolic preservative or makes use of ALT-B4’s phenol stability.
MSD’s invalidity attacks failed. The Court held EP 622 sufficiently disclosed, novel, inventive and not to contain added matter.
Infringement
The Court found that ALT-B4 satisfies all features of claim 1 of EP 622, including the claimed amino-acid substitutions and the functional phenol-stability feature. Halozyme’s evidence sufficiently showed increased phenol stability; MSD’s counter-study tested co-formulations rather than ALT-B4 as such.
The Court rejected MSD’s argument that Keytruda SC falls outside the scope of EP 622 because it does not contain a phenolic preservative and therefore does not make use of ALT-B4’s increased phenol stability.
Other jurisdictions
In Germany, validity proceedings are pending before the Bundespatentgericht, which has issued a preliminary opinion stating that the German part of EP 622 is valid. The Landgericht München has granted a PI against infringement of the German part of EP 622; MSD has appealed that decision. Parallel invalidity proceedings are pending in France, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland. Proceedings concerning both invalidity and infringement of the UK part of EP 622 are pending before the High Court. Related proceedings concerning patents from the same patent family are also pending in the United States, Israel and Canada.
Cross-border injunction
Referring to the CJEU decision in BSH Hausgeräte/Electrolux, the Court held that pending foreign invalidity proceedings do not automatically require a stay. The relevant question is whether there is a reasonable and non-negligible chance that foreign (parts of European) patent(s) will be invalidated. The Court saw no such chance: it had rejected MSD’s invalidity attacks against the Dutch part, the Bundespatentgericht had issued a positive preliminary validity opinion on the German part, and the Landgericht München had rejected MSD’s invalidity arguments in PI proceedings.
The Court also considered that MSD did not rely on any materially different invalidity arguments, prior art or evidence in said foreign proceedings. The Court ruled that the respective cross-border injunction lapses if the relevant national part is held invalid by the competent national court and revives if that finding is overturned on appeal.
Unlawful act
The Court also considered whether MSD acted unlawfully by facilitating infringement through its central European marketing authorization (“MA”). It held that merely holding an MA is not an infringement, but involvement in infringement may amount to an unlawful act under Dutch law. The Court prohibited MSD from unlawfully facilitating infringement committed by MSD group companies, by making its MA for Keytruda SC available to them.
Conclusion
The decision confirms that a modified enzyme may infringe a product claim with functional features even if the marketed formulation does not itself contain the excipient or condition by which the claimed functional property is tested. The Court granted cross-border injunctions without staying the case despite parallel foreign invalidity proceedings, because it saw no reasonable chance of invalidation. Moreover, the decision underlines that a MA holder may act unlawfully if it intentionally facilitates infringing launches by affiliated companies.
Lisa van Baarsel
Attorney at Law
Abolition of the Compensation Scheme for transition payment in cases of long term incapacity for work postponed to 1 January 2028
Employers who terminate an employment contract after 104 weeks of incapacity for work can currently, subject to certain conditions, be compensated by the Employee Insurance Agency (UWV) for the transition payment they have paid. The scheme was due to be abolished with effect from 1 January 2027, but this has now changed: the abolition of the scheme has been postponed until 1 January 2028.
What is the compensation scheme?
Since 1 April 2020, employers have been able to apply for compensation for the transition payment they pay upon termination of the employment contract after the end of the waiting period (the 104-week period during which wages must continue to be paid in the event of illness).
The scheme was introduced to combat the practice of so-called “dormant employment contracts” (slapende dienstverbanden): employment relationships that were formally kept in place after 104 weeks of illness solely in order to avoid paying the transition payment.
In its Xella decision, the Dutch Supreme Court held that an employer is, in principle, required to cooperate with a reasonable request from a long-term incapacitated employee to terminate the employment contract, with payment of a transition payment calculated as at the day following the end of the waiting period, precisely because the transition payment can be recovered under the compensation scheme.
What was due to change on 1 July 2026?
In June 2025, the bill entitled “Limiting the compensation scheme for transition payments in cases of long-term incapacity for work to small employers” was submitted to Parliament. Under that bill, only small employers would still have been entitled to compensation from 1 July 2026. Whether an employer qualifies as a small employer is determined by reference to its total wage bill (2026 threshold: less than EUR 1,082,500).
What will change on 1 January 2028?
In a letter dated 24 April 2026, Minister Vijlbrief announced that the entry into force would be postponed until 1 January 2027. The reasons given were the caretaker status of the previous cabinet; the current cabinet’s intention to abolish the scheme in its entirety, partly in light of its wish to revise the rules on the transition payment; the fact that the bill has yet to be considered by both Houses of Parliament; and feasibility of implementation, as the UWV would otherwise have had to take irreversible steps in the coming months.
On 29 May 2026, the cabinet amended the bill and decided that the compensation scheme would be abolished in its entirety with effect from 1 January 2027. It has now been announced that this date will be moved to 1 January 2028. This means that, from that date onwards, no employer will be able to claim compensation under the scheme.
What does this mean for employers?
The postponement creates an additional period during which employers can still apply for compensation under the current rules. If the waiting period (in principle 104 weeks) ends before 1 January 2028 and you subsequently terminate the employment of the employee with payment of the transition payment, you will in principle still be eligible for compensation from the UWV, provided that you apply in time (within six months of the payment having been made in full).
From 1 January 2028, employers will no longer be able to recover the transition payment from the UWV upon termination after the waiting period. This has direct budgetary consequences and also raises questions, such as whether an employer, in its capacity as a good employer, is still obliged to cooperate with a reasonable request for termination from a long-term incapacitated employee. After all, in the Xella decision the Supreme Court reached that conclusion on the premise that the transition payment would be compensated, an option that may then no longer exist.
On 2 June 2026, the Minister acknowledged these concerns in a memorandum. He expects the decision to lead to an increase in the number of dormant employment contracts. It is to be hoped that the legislature will provide clarity on this point in the run-up to 1 January 2027.
Questions?
Do you have any questions about (the abolition of) the compensation scheme and/or the termination of the employment contract of a long-term incapacitated employee? Please do not hesitate to contact Lisa van Baarsel, Rose Horstman or any of our other employment law specialists.
Tahir Bodha
Attorney at Law
CJEU clarifies: Political parody does not necessarily justify free-riding on a well-known trademark (IKEA v Vlaams Belang)
On 8 September 2026, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) handed down its judgment in Case C-298/23 in the proceedings between Inter IKEA Systems BV (“IKEA”) and Algemeen Vlaams Belang VZW (“Vlaams Belang”), amongst others. The CJEU clarified the conditions under which freedom of expression, including political parody, may constitute a “due cause” for the unauthorised use of a well-known trademark under Article 9(2)(c) EU Trademark Regulation (EUTMR) and Article 10(2)(c) and 10(6) of the Trademark Directive (TMD).
What preceded
In 2022, the Belgian political party Vlaams Belang launched a campaign entitled “IKEA-plan – Immigratie Kan Echt Anders” (“Immigration Can Truly Be Different”), presenting its proposals for reform of Belgian asylum and immigration policy. The campaign made extensive use of signs and visual elements closely resembling the well-known IKEA trademarks, including the distinctive typeface, blue-and-yellow colour palette, and IKEA-style assembly-manual imagery. IKEA brought trademark infringement proceedings before the Commercial Court in Brussels. One of the parties involved is Vrijheidsfonds VZW (“Vrijheidsfonds”), a non-profit association that ran the campaign on behalf of Vlaams Belang. Vrijheidsfonds acknowledged the unauthorized use and argued that the popularity of the IKEA trademarks was deliberately exploited to amplify its political message, constituting a “due cause” under EU trademark law. The referring court stayed proceedings and submitted a preliminary reference to the CJEU.
Assessment of the CJEU
Two legal routes
The CJEU distinguishes and confirms two applicable routes that freedom of expression, including political opinion and political parody, can in principle constitute a “due cause”: (i) use in the course of trade for goods or services under Article 9(2)(c) EUTMR / Article 10(2)(c) TMD, and (ii) use other than to distinguish goods or services under Article 10(6) TMD (implemented for Benelux trademarks in Article 2.20(2)(d) BCIP).
Freedom of expression as “due cause” – high threshold The trademark owner must first demonstrate actual infringement of its well-known trademark or at least a serious risk that such infringement will occur in the future. Once that threshold is met, a general invocation of free speech is insufficient. The third party must demonstrate that, in the specific circumstances, its interest in freedom of expression outweighs the exclusive rights of the trademark owner.
The CJEU identified the key criteria for that balancing exercise:
Intent and good faith: use must be genuinely motivated by the exercise of free expression in good faith, not merely to ride on the coattails of a well-known trademark or to damage it;
Link to the trademark itself: the strongest justification exists where the trademark is used to express an opinion about the trademark, its owner, or its products/services, or to contribute to a debate of general interest connected to the trademark;
Public interest: political speech and satire enjoy strong protection – but the debate must have a genuine connection to the trademark as such;
Consequences for the trademark owner: the intensity, scale, and manner of use, the degree of similarity, and whether use creates the impression that the owner endorses the political message are all relevant.
Importantly, the outcome of the balancing exercise under Article 10(6) TMD need not necessarily be the same as under Article 9(2)(c) EUTMR / Article 10(2)(c) TMD. The CJEU explained that expression outside the commercial domain may enjoy broader protection under the ECHR case law than strictly “commercial” expression.
Application to IKEA/Vlaams Belang
The CJEU provided clear guidance to the referring court. IKEA is an acronym coined from personal names, carrying no independent semantic meaning that could justify its use in this context. Vrijheidsfonds used the trademarks not to comment on IKEA, its products, or its practices but solely to use their reputation in a debate on immigration policy unconnected to the trademarks. The signs were very strongly similar or identical, the use was repeated, and it was disseminated online to a potentially unlimited audience. The CJEU further noted that the public might perceive IKEA as endorsing Vlaams Belang’s message contrary to IKEA’s political neutrality. The CJEU therefore concluded that Vrijheidsfonds’ interest in political expression did not appear to outweigh IKEA’s rights, subject to final verification by the referring court.
Conclusion
This judgment is significant for trademark owners across the EU. The CJEU makes clear that well-known trademarks enjoy robust protection even in the context of political campaigns: freedom of expression cannot be used as a blanket license to free ride on a well-known trademark. The decisive question is whether use of the specific trademark is genuinely necessary to exercise free speech, which will rarely be the case where a trademark is exploited solely for its reputational pull to amplify an unrelated message. Trademark owners confronted with unauthorized use in political or satirical contexts should document the absence of any genuine link between their trademark and the (political) debate, the extent of dissemination, and any reputational harm or false impression of endorsement. Conversely, third parties must be prepared to demonstrate concrete, good-faith reasons why use of the specific trademark was necessary to convey their message.
Arnout Koeman
Attorney at Law
New EU rules for large companies: what do the guidelines on the abuse of market power mean for you?
On 3 September 2026, the European Commission published new guidelines on how it deals with large companies that abuse their market power to sideline competitors. Following a three-year process, involving extensive consultations with businesses, academics and public authorities, clear rules are now in place. These guidelines are important for anyone doing business in the EU.
The background
Imagine this: a single company is so large and powerful in a particular market that competitors have hardly any fair chance to grow or even enter the market. That is what competition law seeks to prevent. European rules have long prohibited this: Article 102 of the EU Treaty stipulates that a company with a dominant position must not abuse that position to drive others out of the market. But what exactly constitutes ‘abuse’ has been a matter of dispute for years.
Until now, the Commission has used a 2008 document as a guide, which no longer accurately reflected current practice involving large technology companies and digital platforms. That document is now being withdrawn and replaced by the new guidelines.
What is changing?
For the first time, the new guidelines explain in a coherent manner how the Commission assesses whether a company is dominant and whether it is abusing its position to squeeze out competitors. A number of points stand out.
When is a company ‘dominant’? A company that controls more than half of a market is generally regarded as dominant. However, a dominant position can also exist with smaller market shares, sometimes even below forty per cent. This is the case, for example, if customers are heavily dependent on that company or if it is practically impossible for competitors to enter that market.
What constitutes prohibited conduct? The guidelines describe specific forms of abuse: predatory pricing (setting prices so low that competitors go bankrupt), exclusive dealing arrangements (requiring customers to buy exclusively from the dominant firm), refusing to supply competitors, and tying. Another new feature is the explicit focus on behaviour that is, by its very nature, harmful to competition, such as the active dismantling of infrastructure on which a competitor relies, in which case the Commission is now required to prove virtually no justification at all.
When is such conduct nevertheless permitted? A dominant firm may defend itself by demonstrating that its conduct is objectively necessary or that the benefits to consumers outweigh the disadvantages. The bar is set high: the greater the market power, the more convincing the evidence must be.
Implications for practice
The new guidelines are primarily intended to provide clarity. Any major market player operating in Europe would be well advised to assess its commercial strategy against these guidelines. Issues such as discount structures for large customers, exclusivity agreements with distributors or the refusal to grant access to proprietary infrastructure can now be assessed against a clearer framework.
For smaller companies and new entrants, the publication actually provides a framework: if you suspect that a major player is forcing you out of the market, the guidelines offer tools to substantiate a complaint to the Commission or the national competition authority. National courts can also use the guidelines as a point of reference.
The Commission emphasises, however, that the guidelines relate exclusively to behaviour that excludes competitors. Abuse that directly harms consumers — such as excessively high prices — falls outside the scope of the current guidelines; the Commission reserves the right to publish separate guidelines on this at a later date. Furthermore, the Court of Justice of the EU has the final say on the interpretation of the concepts set out in the new guidelines .
Do you have any questions about the new guidelines, or would you like to know what they mean for your business or sector? Please contact Arnout Koeman, Monika Beck or one of our other Competition and EU specialists.
Marleen van den Horst
Attorney at Law
NL Provisions Judge: pharmacy exemption for semaglutide not applicable
On 5 August 2026, the Provisions Judge of the District Court of The Hague (“Provisions Judge”) rendered his decision in the PI proceedings initiated by Novo Nordisk A/S (“Novo Nordisk”) against Ceban Ziekenhuisfarmacie B.V. (“Ceban”). Novo Nordisk was granted a preliminary injunction against Ceban for infringing its SPC 300936 (“SPC 936”) for semaglutide. Ceban had compounded and supplied a semaglutide-containing nasal spray under the name Semanova. According to the Provisions Judge, the pharmacy exemption under article 54c(e) of the Dutch Patent Act (ROW 1995) must be construed narrowly. It applies only where medical necessity for an individual patient is demonstrated. It does not cover structural or large-scale compounding of patented medicines.
What preceded
Novo Nordisk is the holder of SPC 936 for the product semaglutide, based on EP 1 863 839 (“EP 839”). EP 839 covers the active ingredient semaglutide and expired on 20 March 2026. SPC 936 is valid until 19 March 2031. Novo Nordisk markets several products containing semaglutide in the Netherlands: Ozempic® for type 2 diabetes and Wegovy® for obesity, both as once-weekly subcutaneous injections, and Rybelsus® for type 2 diabetes in tablet form.
Ceban, a pharmacy, compounded a semaglutide-containing nasal spray under the name Semanova in 2025, without a marketing authorisation and without Novo Nordisk’s permission. Ceban supplied 44 nasal sprays, partly on prescription to its own patients and partly to other pharmacies. It also listed Semanova in the G-standaard, the Dutch pricelist. In total, Ceban imported 600 grams of semaglutide from a Chinese supplier, sufficient for 15,000 vials.
After Novo Nordisk’s cease-and-desist letter and the writ of summons, Ceban stopped supplying the nasal spray. Shortly thereafter, a Ceban employee gave a presentation at a pharmacists’ conference in Porto entitled “Semaglutide nasal spray: a Novel Compounded Formulation”, including a slide headed “Where did we get the idea from?”
Pharmacy exemption – assessment
Since the validity of EP 839 and SPC 936 was not contested, the key question was whether Ceban could rely on the pharmacy exemption under article 54c(e) of the Dutch Patent Act, which was introduced into the Dutch Patent Act in February 2019.
The Provisions Judge first clarified that the regulatory pharmacy exemption is not the same as the (patent-law) pharmacy exemption under article 54c(e) of the Dutch Patent Act. The regulatory exemption concerns an exception to the requirement of obtaining a marketing authorisation, which serves to protect public health and
the quality, safety and efficacy of medicines, in order to safeguard the availability of necessary medicines for individual patients. The pharmacy exemption based on article 54c(e) of the Dutch Patent Act, by contrast, concerns an exception to the exclusive rights of the patentee. Therefore, even if a pharmacy preparation were to fall within the regulatory pharmacy exemption, this does not automatically entail that the requirements of the pharmacy exemption based on patent law are met.
The Provisions Judge held that article 54c(e) of the Dutch Patent Act is an exception to the exclusive rights of the patentee, which must be construed narrowly. Its rationale lies in public health: it applies only where there is a medical necessity, e.g. where an individual patient requires a dosage or method of administration that is not available in the patentee’s authorised medicinal product. The exception does not allow a pharmacy to compound a patented medicine on a structural scale without the patentee’s consent.
The Provisions Judge considered that supplying the nasal sprays to other pharmacies, keeping them in stock for that purpose and listing Semanova in the G-standaard fell outside the scope of the pharmacy exemption. The listing in the G-standaard was specifically considered an act of offering, reserved to the patent holder.
As regards Ceban’s own patients, the Provisions Judge found that Ceban had not made sufficiently plausible that there was an unmet medical necessity. Ceban stated that the nasal spray had been developed for patients with a fear of needles, but did not explain why the individual patients concerned had such a fear or why off-label prescribing of Rybelsus®, Novo Nordisk’s semaglutide tablet, would not have been sufficient.
The Provisions Judge considered that Ceban’s conduct pointed towards structural and potentially large-scale use. In particular, the Court referred to Ceban’s presentation in Portugal, the import of 600 grams of semaglutide, sufficient for 15,000 vials, the listing in the G-standaard and the use of the brand name Semanova. These circumstances were difficult to reconcile with Ceban’s position that the nasal spray was prepared only for individual patients on the basis of medical necessity.
The Provisions Judge therefore held that Ceban could not rely on the pharmacy exemption and ordered Ceban to cease its infringement of SPC 936 in the Netherlands.
Conclusion
The decision confirms that the pharmacy exemption under article 54c(e) of the Dutch Patent Act is distinct from the regulatory pharmacy exemption. It also points out that the exemption based on the Dutch Patent Act is construed narrowly and does not cover structural or large-scale compounding without demonstrated medical necessity for individual patients.
Marleen van den Horst
Attorney at Law
NL District Court denies Merck an SPC for cladribine (Mavenclad)
On 5 August 2026, the Administrative Division of the District Court of The Hague (‘the Court’) rendered its decision in proceedings between Merck Serono S.A. (‘Merck’) and the Dutch Patent Office (Octrooicentrum Nederland, ‘OCNL’). The Court upheld OCNL’s refusal to grant an SPC for the product cladribine, marketed as Mavenclad for the treatment of multiple sclerosis. This decision confirms that, following the CJEU’s ruling in Santen, a marketing authorisation (‘MA’) for a new therapeutic indication of a previously authorised active substance cannot qualify as the first MA for the product within the meaning of Article 3(d) of Regulation 469/2009 (‘SPC Regulation’).
What preceded
On 22 February 2018, Merck filed an SPC application (no. 300930) for cladribine based on EP 1 827 461 (‘EP 461’), referring to the MA for Mavenclad (EU/1/17/1212, dated 24 August 2017) as the first MA. EP 461 was granted for the active ingredient cladribine and is a second medical use patent. EP 461 covers a regimen for treating multiple sclerosis. EP 461 expired on 20 December 2025.
Cladribine had previously been authorised as the active ingredient in two other medicinal products: Leustatin (1995) and Litak (2004), both for the treatment of hairy cell leukaemia.
OCNL refused the SPC application as it did not meet the requirement of Article 3(d) of the SPC Regulation. Merck filed an appeal against this decision.
Merck argued that OCNL should have granted the SPC. Mavenclad enables the first use of cladribine for the treatment of multiple sclerosis, which is a new therapeutic use. The earlier MAs for Leustatin and Litak related to a different therapeutic indication, namely hairy cell leukaemia. Merck further submitted that it had undergone a full de novo development programme (Phase I, II, III, and IV studies) to obtain the MA for Mavenclad. According to Merck, the CJEU’s ruling in Santen (C-673/18) is not the appropriate framework and the Court should instead follow Neurim (C-130/11). If necessary, the Court should refer preliminary questions to the CJEU.
Assessment of the Court – first MA
The parties agreed that the conditions of Article 3(a), (b), and (c) of the SPC Regulation were met. The disputed issue was whether Article 3(d) is satisfied: could the MA for Mavenclad be regarded as the first MA for cladribine as a medicinal product. The Court answered this question in the negative.
The Court held that the text of Article 3(d) is clear: the MA on which the SPC is based must be the first MA for placing the product on the market as a medicinal product. The Court observed that an MA for a new therapeutic application (second medical indication) of a previously authorised active substance is, according to the CJEU, explicitly not to be regarded as the first MA within the meaning of Article 3(d). It was not in dispute that the MAs for Leustatin and Litak relate to the same active ingredient, namely cladribine. It follows that the MA for Mavenclad is not the first MA for placing cladribine on the market as a medicinal product, so that no SPC can be granted for that product.
The Court rejected Merck’s argument that Santen does not provide the correct framework and that the Court should instead follow Neurim. The Court pointed out that the CJEU in Santen explicitly departed from its earlier decision in Neurim. The Court referred to its earlier decisions in Genmab (2023) and in Boehringer (2025), in which it had already addressed the interpretation of Article 3(d) of the SPC Regulation, and observed that ‘… those considerations are repeated and incorporated herein’. In respect of the Boehringer case, we refer to our La Gro Pharma Update of 28 May 2025.
No preliminary questions to the CJEU
The Court found no reason to refer the case to the CJEU for preliminary questions on the interpretation of Article 3(d). It qualified the matter as an acte éclairé.
The fact that SPCs for cladribine have been granted in some other Member States does not lead to a different outcome. The same applies to the fact that the BPatG in its referral decision of 12 December 2025 in the parallel Boehringer case provisionally took a different view on certain points than this Court (and the Cour d’Appel de Paris). It referred preliminary questions to the CJEU (case C-15/26). The BPatG also acknowledged that the CJEU in Santen expressly departed from its previous case law, but doubts whether Santen’s broad interpretation also applies where the earlier MA concerns a human medicinal product and the later MA a veterinary medicinal product, i.e. the situation in the Boehringer case.
According to the Court that doubt does not arise here, where both the earlier and later MAs concern human medicinal products.
Conclusion
The Court dismissed Merck’s appeal and upheld OCNL’s refusal to grant an SPC for cladribine. The MA for Mavenclad is not the first MA for cladribine as a medicinal product within the meaning of Article 3(d) of the SPC Regulation, as two earlier MAs had been granted for the same active ingredient. Although no SPC can be granted, Mavenclad continues to enjoy regulatory market exclusivity under Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 until August 2027.
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