On 2 July, the Court of Appeal of the UPC (“CoA”) handed down its decision in the PI proceedings between Guardant Health, Inc. (“Guardant”) and Sophia Genetics SA et al. (“Sophia”). Both parties appealed the decision of the Local Division Paris (“LD Paris”) of 23 January 2026. Although Guardant successfully objected to the finding that the patent was likely invalid for added matter, the CoA held that the urgency requirement was not met and therefore no PI was granted. What preceded Guardant is the proprietor of EP 3 443 066 (“EP 066”), which claims a method for detecting the presence or absence of colorectal, ovarian, lung or pancreatic cancer. EP 066 was granted on 2 October 2024 and claims priority of 14 and 18 April 2016. No opposition was filed. In addition to its UPC designation, EP 066 is in force in CH, ES and the UK. Sophia offers the MSK-DDM test in the UPC territories, CH, ES and NO. On 27 May 2025, Guardant sent a warning letter to Sophia arguing that the MSK-DDM test falls within the scope of several patents, but not mentioning EP 066. Sophia replied on 20 June 2025. On 14 July 2025, Guardant started litigation in the UK for infringement of the UK parts of several patents, including EP 066. It lodged its reasons on 18 August 2025. On 29 August 2025, Guardant applied for a PI before the LD Paris for the alleged infringement of several patents, including EP 066. The LD Paris held that the urgency requirement was met, but that EP 066 was likely to be invalid for reasons of added matter and therefore rejected a PI. Guardant appealed the order regarding EP 066 and costs; Sophia lodged a cross-appeal. Assessment of the CoA – urgency The CoA held that the assessment of unreasonable delay depends on the circumstances of the individual case. The decisive point in time is when the applicant has, or should have had, after exercising due diligence, the necessary facts and evidence. The burden of proof rests on the applicant. The CoA found that Guardant acted with unreasonable delay based on the following five principles: 1) A patent holder is not obliged to assert all patents in one application for a PI. If a patent holder has the necessary information for some, but not all patents, delaying the filing until it has information regarding all patents may constitute unreasonable delay. The CoA considers it compatible with procedural efficiency and the frontloaded system to file multiple separate applications weeks apart before the same division, since asserting multiple patents in a single application carries the risk that a prompt decision cannot be expected. 2) If a patent holder is aware, on the basis of a certain document, that one or more of its patents have been infringed, it must not turn a blind eye to the fact that the document also indicates the infringement of its other patents. The fact that the warning letter did not concern EP 066 does not justify the conclusion that Guardant was unaware of the infringement of EP 066. 3) While a patentee is generally not obliged to monitor the market, it must investigate the market with due diligence once it becomes aware of specific circumstances suggesting infringement. As soon as Guardant was aware of infringing activities in the UK, it was expected to investigate whether infringement occurred in the UPC territory, CH and ES. 4) For legal entities, the decisive factor is when the authorised representative body or an individual capable of pursuing the infringement internally becomes aware of the possible infringement (e.g. an employee of the legal department or a senior member of the sales department). The fact that other employees attended Sophia’s online seminars is insufficient, as they were not involved in evaluating potential patent infringement claims and had no obligation to forward information to decision makers. 5) As a general rule, a patent holder may wait a reasonable time for a response to a warning letter before drafting and lodging an application for a PI. However, since the warning letter did not concern EP 066, there was no reason for Guardant to wait for Sophia’s response before drafting an application regarding EP 066. Based on a certain document, the CoA concludes that Guardant (should have) had knowledge of the alleged infringement of the MSK-DDM test by 1 May. All information Guardant further relied upon was publicly available, requiring no substantial investigative measures. A diligent patentee could have completed this inquiry within two weeks, making 15 May 2025 the latest date on which Guardant should have been aware of the infringement in the UPC territory, CH and ES. Therefore, leaving a three-months’ gap from 15 May 2025 until 29 August 2025 for submitting the PI application, while Guardant stated it needed two weeks for drafting, is unreasonable. The patent’s complexity, technical tests and expert consultation do not justify the delay: Guardant failed to specify when the analyses began, for which patents they were essential, their duration or why the delay was reasonable. Even assuming the tests took a month, a two-months delay remained unaccounted for. Conclusion This decision provides a comprehensive guidance on urgency required for PIs in the UPC. The CoA establishes that a patentee: 1) need not assert all patents in one application and must not delay filing once it has sufficient information for some; 2) must not ignore infringement of other patents indicated in a document it has reviewed; 3) must investigate infringement in other designated territories once aware of infringement in one; 4) is deemed aware only when the authorised representative body or an individual capable of pursuing the infringement internally becomes aware of it and 5) may wait for a response to a warning letter, but not if that letter did not concern the patent at issue. As Guardant failed to meet these principles, no PI was granted.

In the case between the trade unions FNV and CNV and the Temper platform, the Court of Appeal ruled that workers carrying out work via the Temper platform qualify as agency workers. Temper therefore qualifies as a temporary employment agency. This marks another milestone in the series of court rulings on platform work and sends a clear signal to (temporary) employers who make use of platform workers. Temper is an online platform where workers and clients can connect and agree on the work to be carried out. Temper presents itself as a neutral intermediary: a digital marketplace where self-employed people (freelancers) can secure assignments from companies that need extra help on a temporary basis. FNV and CNV took the following position. In their opinion there is a temporary employment contract between Temper and the Temper workers as referred to in Article 7:690 of the Dutch Civil Code. The workers were not ‘genuine entrepreneurs’, but agency workers, with all the legal consequences that entails. What is the court’s ruling? Contrary to the ruling of the Amsterdam District Court, the Court of Appeal has concluded that a temporary employment contract exists between Temper and a worker, as a result of which Temper qualifies as a temporary employment agency. The Court of Appeal reaches this conclusion by applying the criteria set out in the Supreme Court’s Deliveroo judgment. In doing so, the Court of Appeal considers that Temper is closely involved in the establishment of the contractual triangular relationship between Temper, the worker and the client. Temper is also closely involved in how remuneration is determined, how it is paid out and the amount of the remuneration. Given this degree of involvement, Temper – according to the Court of Appeal – cannot be characterised as a mere intermediary platform. The Court of Appeal also ruled that the workers run no (substantial) commercial risk with regard to the question of whether the workers act as entrepreneurs in the course of economic activity. The Court of Appeal considers that there is no evidence to suggest that a significant number of workers have made ‘substantial investments’, given that the list of Temper’s top 25 clients shows that these roles involve work for which no investment is required. The number of workers who are not registered with the Chamber of Commerce, and the fact that entrepreneurship – which is aimed at making a profit – is incompatible with an average hourly rate of €20.78, mean that Temper’s defence does not hold up with regard to these Deliveroo criteria either. All in all, the working relationship is characterised predominantly by factors relating to employment agreement and not – or at least to a much lesser extent – by factors indicative of genuine entrepreneurship. What does this mean in practice? The Temper ruling is the latest in a series of platform rulings following those on Deliveroo and Uber, and once again demonstrates that the actual working situation is of decisive importance. This applies not only to the traditional employer-employee relationship, but also to triangular arrangements such as this one. For Temper and similar platforms, being classified as a temporary employment agency has far-reaching consequences under employment law. As a temporary employment agency, Temper must comply with the Waadi and the collective agreement for temporary workers, as well as ensure pension accrual via StiPP. Contact Do you have any questions about the classification of your employment relationships with platform workers or about the implications of the Temper ruling for your organisation? If so, please contact Lisa van Baarsel, Dunia Caillette or one of our other employment law specialists.

On 12 May 2026, the House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer) approved the legislative proposal More Certainty for Flexible Workers. This brings the introduction of new rules for on-call workers, temporary employees, and agency workers one step closer. In addition, the House of Representatives made a number of significant amendments to the proposal. The legislative proposal More Certainty for Flexible Workers aims to provide employees on flexible contracts with greater certainty regarding their income and working hours. Flexible contracts include, for example, on-call contracts, agency work contracts, and fixed-term contracts. In the Netherlands, nearly three in ten employees work on a flexible contract, making the Netherlands the front-runner in flexible working for the EU. Zero-hours contracts to be abolished, except for under-18s, pupils, students, and those entitled to the state pension One of the most widely discussed aspects of the legislative proposal is the replacement of zero-hours contracts with bandwidth contracts. A bandwidth contract closely resembles the current minimum/maximum contract, but the minimum number of contracted hours may no longer be zero, and the maximum may not exceed 130% of the minimum. An exception is made for young people under the age of 18, those that still go to school, students, and those entitled to the state pension (AOW) insofar as they work no more than 16 hours per week. This group may continue to work on a zero-hours contract. The rationale behind this is that workers in these categories still have a legitimate need for flexibility. The successive contracts rule is only broken after 36 months A fixed-term contract can, by operation of law, convert into a permanent contract. This is known as the ‘successive contracts rule’ (ketenregeling). The rule is triggered when a chain of contracts has exceeded a period of 36 months, or when a fourth contract is concluded, as long as the chain was not interrupted for a sufficiently long period at some earlier point. Currently, a gap of six months between two contracts breaks the chain. Under the legislative proposal, this interruption period will increase to 36 months. Only for pupils and students working no more than 16 hours per week will the interruption period remain at six months. This amendment is designed to prevent abuse: after the change, merely waiting before offering an employee a new contract is substantially less practical. The rules set out in the paragraph will apply to contracts concluded after 1 January 2028. Contracts concluded before that date will continue to be governed by the current rules. Improved legal position of agency workers Finally, the legislative proposal strengthens the position of agency workers. Phase A of an agency arrangement will be reduced from 78 weeks to 52 weeks. Phase B will change from a maximum of six contracts over four years to six contracts over two years. After Phase B, an agency worker must be offered a permanent employment contract. The House of Representatives has added to the legislative proposal that an agency clause (uitzendbeding) may not be invoked during any period in which an agency worker is incapacitated for work due to illness. As a result, an agency worker can no longer lose their job and income simply because they have fallen ill. Furthermore, the House of Representatives has tightened the rules on the terms and conditions of employment applicable to agency workers. The legislative proposal already establishes the principle that agency workers are entitled to at least equivalent terms and conditions of employment as employees who are directly employed by the client. For specific employment conditions, such as pay, allowances, holiday pay, bonuses, end-of-year payments, and leave arrangements, derogation will no longer be possible at all. What does this mean in practice? The legislative proposal is now before the Senate (Eerste Kamer). It is expected to be adopted, although further amendments may be made before it passes. Do you have questions about the effect the legislative proposal More Certainty for Flexible Workers will have on your organization? Feel free to contact Rose Horstman or any of our other specialists.

On 16 April 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) delivered an important judgment on the question of when victims in cartel damage cases may sue multiple group companies before a single court. The judgment is relevant for companies operating within international group structures, but also for parties seeking to recover damages following a competition infringement. Central to the case is the so-called ‘anchor defendant’: a defendant established in the Netherlands who is used to bring foreign co-defendants before the Dutch courts. The background The ruling stems from two Dutch proceedings before the Amsterdam Court of Appeal. The first case concerned claims for damages arising from the power cables cartel. The second case concerned claims for damages arising from an Italian cartel in the market for cardboard and packaging materials. In both proceedings, not only were companies summoned that were directly named in a cartel decision, but also other group companies. Some of these were established in the Netherlands and acted as anchor defendants. The claimants sought to bring all defendants jointly before the Dutch courts on the basis of Article 8(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation. That provision allows multiple defendants to be summoned before the court of the domicile of one of them, provided there is such a close connection between the claims that joint proceedings are desirable. The aim of this is to prevent different courts from issuing conflicting decisions. The judgment of the CJEU The CJEU has ruled that a close connection may also exist where the anchor defendant is not itself designated as a liable party in the cartel decision. The decisive factor is whether there are serious indications that the anchor defendant belongs to the same ‘undertaking’ within the meaning of competition law as the entities to which the infringement has been attributed. The concept of ‘undertaking’ in EU competition law is broader than that of a separate legal entity. Different companies within a group may together form a single economic unit. In such a case, liability for a cartel infringement may, under certain circumstances, extend throughout the group. The CJEU does emphasize, however, that Article 8(1) must not be used artificially. A claimant may therefore not sue a Dutch company with no genuine connection to the dispute solely to bring foreign parties to the Netherlands. However, when determining jurisdiction, the court does not need to assess in full whether the claim against the anchor defendant will succeed on its merits. This may only be relevant if that claim is manifestly unfounded or artificial. Finally, the CJEU confirms that Article 8(1) not only designates international jurisdiction but also the court with relative jurisdiction within the Member State: the court of the domicile of the defendant against whom the action is brought. A national referral to another competent court within the same Member State remains possible, provided that this does not undermine the effectiveness of the Regulation. Implications for practice This judgment strengthens the position of claimants in cartel damages cases. They are given greater scope to concentrate related claims against various group companies before a single court, even if the anchor defendant is not itself named in the cartel decision. For international groups, this means that group structures must be scrutinized. Even companies that are not themselves the addressees of a fine decision may be involved in civil proceedings if they form part of the same economic unit. The judgment thus once again underlines the importance of effective competition law compliance across the entire group. Do you have any questions regarding international jurisdiction or actions for damages? Please contact Arnout Koeman, Lennart Hoeksema or one of our other Competition and EU or Commercial Litigation specialists.

On 10 April 2026, the Supreme Court handed down a judgment of significance to investment companies and conglomerates with multiple subsidiaries. The central question was whether a parent company fined by the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (“ACM”) for a cartel infringement committed by its subsidiary can recover the fine paid from that subsidiary. The Supreme Court’s answer is clear, but contains a nuance that is important in practice. The case Between 2004 and 2011, the investment firm Bencis held an indirect stake in Meneba, a Dutch flour manufacturer. From 2001 to 2007, Meneba participated in a cartel of flour manufacturers, in breach of article 6 of the Competition Act and article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Dutch Competition Authority (the legal predecessor of the ACM) therefore imposed a fine of €9 million on Meneba in 2010. On 17 July 2014, the ACM also decided to impose a fine on Bencis. This fine followed Bencis’s sale of its shares in Meneba in 2011. The basis for this fine was that Bencis, as the parent company, was able to exercise decisive influence over Meneba’s commercial policy, meaning that, for the purposes of competition law, it formed a single undertaking with its subsidiary Meneba. The fine imposed on Bencis amounted to over €1.27 million. Although Bencis contested the fine, it was upheld by both the Administrative Court and the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal (“CBb”). Bencis considered it unfair that it had to pay a fine for the conduct of its former subsidiary and brought the matter before the civil court. It claimed compensation from Dossche (the party that had acquired Meneba in 2018) for the fine imposed on it. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed the claims. As set out in further detail below, the cassation appeal lodged against this decision was also dismissed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court’s ruling The Supreme Court held, first and foremost, that the allocation of liability for a competition fine within a single undertaking is governed by national law, subject to the EU law principles of effectiveness and equivalence. Insofar as Bencis based its claim on a tort (Article 6:162 of the Civil Code), the Supreme Court ruled that a breach of competition law by a subsidiary is not automatically unlawful vis-à-vis the parent company. Additional circumstances are required for this, for example that the subsidiary deliberately misled the parent company or kept it unaware of the infringement. As Bencis failed to establish such additional circumstances, the claim for tortious liability was dismissed. The Supreme Court did not assess the substance of Bencis’s argument that Meneba had been unjustly enriched at Bencis’s expense, on the grounds that Meneba had paid a lower fine than would have been the case had it been the sole party fined. However, the Court of Appeal had already ruled that there was no unjust enrichment, a ruling which was upheld on appeal. Conclusion and practical implications This judgment could have far-reaching consequences for investment companies and other conglomerates. Where a parent company exercises decisive influence over a subsidiary, it runs the risk of being held personally liable for that subsidiary’s competition law infringements, even if it was unaware of them. As this judgment emphasises, recouping a fine imposed on the subsidiary from the parent company is only possible if the parent company can demonstrate additional circumstances from which it follows that the subsidiary acted unlawfully, for example through deception or the deliberate withholding of information. The lesson is clear. Investment firms and conglomerates would be well advised to invest in ongoing compliance within their portfolio companies. Neither conducting due diligence prior to an acquisition nor carrying out annual checks on whether any legal violations have been committed is, in itself, sufficient to avoid liability for fines or to recover any such fine from a subsidiary. Organisations that have not yet taken sufficient action in this area would benefit from offering their staff and directors targeted training and education in competition law. A well-structured compliance programme not only reduces the risk of breaching the cartel prohibition, but also strengthens the organisation’s position in any enforcement proceedings. Are you interested in compliance training courses, or do you have any questions on this subject or any other questions regarding competition law? Please do not hesitate to contact Arnout Koeman, Noa van den Brink, or one of our other competition law specialists.

The Dutch healthcare sector is facing radical changes. Rising healthcare costs, staff shortages and the call for a future-proof healthcare landscape are forcing hospitals, healthcare providers and health insurers to work more closely together and redistribute care. However, cooperation in healthcare quickly touches on competition law: when healthcare institutions make agreements amongst themselves about who provides which care, this can easily qualify as a prohibited market-sharing agreement. The Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (“ACM”) recently published a letter on this subject, addressed to the parties participating in the ‘Round Table on a Future-Proof Healthcare Landscape through Concentration and Distribution’. This is an important signal for all healthcare providers and insurers active in regional partnerships. Description of the letter The ACM notes that healthcare markets are undergoing significant change. Healthcare stakeholders — including patient organisations, healthcare providers, hospitals and health insurers — are working together to create a regionally balanced healthcare landscape for the future. The Round Table, led by the Dutch Healthcare Institute, is the platform where this collaboration takes shape. ACM recognises the social importance of these developments and wishes to contribute constructively. At the same time, the regulator emphasises that agreements on the redistribution of healthcare between healthcare institutions must be assessed against competition rules. Such agreements may amount to market-sharing agreements — one of the most serious categories of competition infringements under Article 6 of the Dutch Competition Act and Article 101 TFEU. To provide legal certainty to the parties, the ACM has indicated that it will not initiate an investigation on its own initiative into regional healthcare collaborations that may restrict competition, provided the following conditions are met: All relevant parties from the healthcare triangle comprising healthcare providers (including medical specialists and nurses), health insurers and patients are involved. Which patient representatives must be involved depends on the agreements made. Depending on the specific case, patient representatives with specific knowledge of the condition in question may sometimes be required. Concrete, measurable and identifiable objectives have been set regarding affordable, accessible and high-quality care, and all relevant parties support these agreements . The ACM thereby sets enforcement priorities: it indicates where its enforcement focus does not lie, without the legal prohibition ceasing to apply. The information letter serves as a guide for parties to organise their cooperation in such a way that it remains within the bounds of competition law. What does this mean for your healthcare organisation? For healthcare institutions, health insurers and other healthcare parties, this notice has concrete implications: The obligation to assess compliance remains. The announcement that the ACM will not conduct proactive investigations does not relieve parties of the obligation to assess their cooperation agreements themselves against the competition rules. The prohibition on market-sharing agreements remains in full force. Document your cooperation carefully. Record the objectives underlying the cooperation, the alternatives considered and the intended benefits for patients. A thorough file is essential in the event of a retrospective review. Seek legal advice at an early stage. Particularly in the case of regional reallocation agreements — where hospitals or healthcare providers agree on who will provide certain types of care — the line between such arrangements and prohibited market-sharing agreements is fine. Seeking legal advice early on prevents costly mistakes. Engage with the ACM as a discussion partner. The ACM explicitly states its willingness to contribute ideas regarding potential collaborations. Informal consultation with the regulator — or a formal request for an opinion — can provide valuable clarity before agreements are implemented. Keep an eye on European dimensions. In the case of collaborations that may affect trade between EU Member States, Article 101 TFEU also applies. This is particularly relevant for border regions or where foreign healthcare providers are involved. In short: the ACM allows for cooperation in the healthcare sector, but sets clear boundaries. A proactive and legally sound approach is essential for any healthcare party involved in regional redistribution agreements. Contact Do you have any questions on this subject? Or do you have other competition law queries? Please feel free to contact Arnout Koeman or Monika Beck or one of our other competition law specialists.