Obligation to register de minimis aid as of 1 January 2026

On 16 April 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) delivered an important judgment on the question of when victims in cartel damage cases may sue multiple group companies before a single court. The judgment is relevant for companies operating within international group structures, but also for parties seeking to recover damages following a competition infringement. Central to the case is the so-called ‘anchor defendant’: a defendant established in the Netherlands who is used to bring foreign co-defendants before the Dutch courts. The background The ruling stems from two Dutch proceedings before the Amsterdam Court of Appeal. The first case concerned claims for damages arising from the power cables cartel. The second case concerned claims for damages arising from an Italian cartel in the market for cardboard and packaging materials. In both proceedings, not only were companies summoned that were directly named in a cartel decision, but also other group companies. Some of these were established in the Netherlands and acted as anchor defendants. The claimants sought to bring all defendants jointly before the Dutch courts on the basis of Article 8(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation. That provision allows multiple defendants to be summoned before the court of the domicile of one of them, provided there is such a close connection between the claims that joint proceedings are desirable. The aim of this is to prevent different courts from issuing conflicting decisions. The judgment of the CJEU The CJEU has ruled that a close connection may also exist where the anchor defendant is not itself designated as a liable party in the cartel decision. The decisive factor is whether there are serious indications that the anchor defendant belongs to the same ‘undertaking’ within the meaning of competition law as the entities to which the infringement has been attributed. The concept of ‘undertaking’ in EU competition law is broader than that of a separate legal entity. Different companies within a group may together form a single economic unit. In such a case, liability for a cartel infringement may, under certain circumstances, extend throughout the group. The CJEU does emphasize, however, that Article 8(1) must not be used artificially. A claimant may therefore not sue a Dutch company with no genuine connection to the dispute solely to bring foreign parties to the Netherlands. However, when determining jurisdiction, the court does not need to assess in full whether the claim against the anchor defendant will succeed on its merits. This may only be relevant if that claim is manifestly unfounded or artificial. Finally, the CJEU confirms that Article 8(1) not only designates international jurisdiction but also the court with relative jurisdiction within the Member State: the court of the domicile of the defendant against whom the action is brought. A national referral to another competent court within the same Member State remains possible, provided that this does not undermine the effectiveness of the Regulation. Implications for practice This judgment strengthens the position of claimants in cartel damages cases. They are given greater scope to concentrate related claims against various group companies before a single court, even if the anchor defendant is not itself named in the cartel decision. For international groups, this means that group structures must be scrutinized. Even companies that are not themselves the addressees of a fine decision may be involved in civil proceedings if they form part of the same economic unit. The judgment thus once again underlines the importance of effective competition law compliance across the entire group. Do you have any questions regarding international jurisdiction or actions for damages? Please contact Arnout Koeman, Lennart Hoeksema or one of our other Competition and EU or Commercial Litigation specialists.

On 10 April 2026, the Supreme Court handed down a judgment of significance to investment companies and conglomerates with multiple subsidiaries. The central question was whether a parent company fined by the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (“ACM”) for a cartel infringement committed by its subsidiary can recover the fine paid from that subsidiary. The Supreme Court’s answer is clear, but contains a nuance that is important in practice. The case Between 2004 and 2011, the investment firm Bencis held an indirect stake in Meneba, a Dutch flour manufacturer. From 2001 to 2007, Meneba participated in a cartel of flour manufacturers, in breach of article 6 of the Competition Act and article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Dutch Competition Authority (the legal predecessor of the ACM) therefore imposed a fine of €9 million on Meneba in 2010. On 17 July 2014, the ACM also decided to impose a fine on Bencis. This fine followed Bencis’s sale of its shares in Meneba in 2011. The basis for this fine was that Bencis, as the parent company, was able to exercise decisive influence over Meneba’s commercial policy, meaning that, for the purposes of competition law, it formed a single undertaking with its subsidiary Meneba. The fine imposed on Bencis amounted to over €1.27 million. Although Bencis contested the fine, it was upheld by both the Administrative Court and the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal (“CBb”). Bencis considered it unfair that it had to pay a fine for the conduct of its former subsidiary and brought the matter before the civil court. It claimed compensation from Dossche (the party that had acquired Meneba in 2018) for the fine imposed on it. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed the claims. As set out in further detail below, the cassation appeal lodged against this decision was also dismissed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court’s ruling The Supreme Court held, first and foremost, that the allocation of liability for a competition fine within a single undertaking is governed by national law, subject to the EU law principles of effectiveness and equivalence. Insofar as Bencis based its claim on a tort (Article 6:162 of the Civil Code), the Supreme Court ruled that a breach of competition law by a subsidiary is not automatically unlawful vis-à-vis the parent company. Additional circumstances are required for this, for example that the subsidiary deliberately misled the parent company or kept it unaware of the infringement. As Bencis failed to establish such additional circumstances, the claim for tortious liability was dismissed. The Supreme Court did not assess the substance of Bencis’s argument that Meneba had been unjustly enriched at Bencis’s expense, on the grounds that Meneba had paid a lower fine than would have been the case had it been the sole party fined. However, the Court of Appeal had already ruled that there was no unjust enrichment, a ruling which was upheld on appeal. Conclusion and practical implications This judgment could have far-reaching consequences for investment companies and other conglomerates. Where a parent company exercises decisive influence over a subsidiary, it runs the risk of being held personally liable for that subsidiary’s competition law infringements, even if it was unaware of them. As this judgment emphasises, recouping a fine imposed on the subsidiary from the parent company is only possible if the parent company can demonstrate additional circumstances from which it follows that the subsidiary acted unlawfully, for example through deception or the deliberate withholding of information. The lesson is clear. Investment firms and conglomerates would be well advised to invest in ongoing compliance within their portfolio companies. Neither conducting due diligence prior to an acquisition nor carrying out annual checks on whether any legal violations have been committed is, in itself, sufficient to avoid liability for fines or to recover any such fine from a subsidiary. Organisations that have not yet taken sufficient action in this area would benefit from offering their staff and directors targeted training and education in competition law. A well-structured compliance programme not only reduces the risk of breaching the cartel prohibition, but also strengthens the organisation’s position in any enforcement proceedings. Are you interested in compliance training courses, or do you have any questions on this subject or any other questions regarding competition law? Please do not hesitate to contact Arnout Koeman, Noa van den Brink, or one of our other competition law specialists.

The Dutch healthcare sector is facing radical changes. Rising healthcare costs, staff shortages and the call for a future-proof healthcare landscape are forcing hospitals, healthcare providers and health insurers to work more closely together and redistribute care. However, cooperation in healthcare quickly touches on competition law: when healthcare institutions make agreements amongst themselves about who provides which care, this can easily qualify as a prohibited market-sharing agreement. The Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (“ACM”) recently published a letter on this subject, addressed to the parties participating in the ‘Round Table on a Future-Proof Healthcare Landscape through Concentration and Distribution’. This is an important signal for all healthcare providers and insurers active in regional partnerships. Description of the letter The ACM notes that healthcare markets are undergoing significant change. Healthcare stakeholders — including patient organisations, healthcare providers, hospitals and health insurers — are working together to create a regionally balanced healthcare landscape for the future. The Round Table, led by the Dutch Healthcare Institute, is the platform where this collaboration takes shape. ACM recognises the social importance of these developments and wishes to contribute constructively. At the same time, the regulator emphasises that agreements on the redistribution of healthcare between healthcare institutions must be assessed against competition rules. Such agreements may amount to market-sharing agreements — one of the most serious categories of competition infringements under Article 6 of the Dutch Competition Act and Article 101 TFEU. To provide legal certainty to the parties, the ACM has indicated that it will not initiate an investigation on its own initiative into regional healthcare collaborations that may restrict competition, provided the following conditions are met: All relevant parties from the healthcare triangle comprising healthcare providers (including medical specialists and nurses), health insurers and patients are involved. Which patient representatives must be involved depends on the agreements made. Depending on the specific case, patient representatives with specific knowledge of the condition in question may sometimes be required. Concrete, measurable and identifiable objectives have been set regarding affordable, accessible and high-quality care, and all relevant parties support these agreements . The ACM thereby sets enforcement priorities: it indicates where its enforcement focus does not lie, without the legal prohibition ceasing to apply. The information letter serves as a guide for parties to organise their cooperation in such a way that it remains within the bounds of competition law. What does this mean for your healthcare organisation? For healthcare institutions, health insurers and other healthcare parties, this notice has concrete implications: The obligation to assess compliance remains. The announcement that the ACM will not conduct proactive investigations does not relieve parties of the obligation to assess their cooperation agreements themselves against the competition rules. The prohibition on market-sharing agreements remains in full force. Document your cooperation carefully. Record the objectives underlying the cooperation, the alternatives considered and the intended benefits for patients. A thorough file is essential in the event of a retrospective review. Seek legal advice at an early stage. Particularly in the case of regional reallocation agreements — where hospitals or healthcare providers agree on who will provide certain types of care — the line between such arrangements and prohibited market-sharing agreements is fine. Seeking legal advice early on prevents costly mistakes. Engage with the ACM as a discussion partner. The ACM explicitly states its willingness to contribute ideas regarding potential collaborations. Informal consultation with the regulator — or a formal request for an opinion — can provide valuable clarity before agreements are implemented. Keep an eye on European dimensions. In the case of collaborations that may affect trade between EU Member States, Article 101 TFEU also applies. This is particularly relevant for border regions or where foreign healthcare providers are involved. In short: the ACM allows for cooperation in the healthcare sector, but sets clear boundaries. A proactive and legally sound approach is essential for any healthcare party involved in regional redistribution agreements. Contact Do you have any questions on this subject? Or do you have other competition law queries? Please feel free to contact Arnout Koeman or Monika Beck or one of our other competition law specialists.

On 16 December 2025, the European Commission adopted the revised version of the Exemption Decision for state aid for services of general economic interest (“SGEI Decision”). The SGEI Decision makes it possible to grant aid for services that cannot usually be provided profitably on the market without the need to notify the aid to the European Commission. This SGEI Decision has now been updated by the European Commission, partly with the aim of stimulating housing construction and combating the housing crisis. What exactly has changed? And what consequences does this have for you? You can read all about it in the blog below! What is state aid? State aid law aims to protect competition by preventing governments from unfairly favouring certain companies. This is achieved through the prohibition of state aid in Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Under Article 107(1) TFEU, state aid is deemed to exist if the following five cumulative conditions are met: The aid is granted to an undertaking engaged in an economic activity; The aid is financed from state resources; The aid confers on the undertaking an economic advantage that it would not have obtained under normal market conditions (non-market conformity); The aid is selective: it applies to one or more specific undertakings or a specific sector/region; The aid may distort competition and adversely affect trade between Member States of the European Union. If all of the above conditions are met, the aid is prohibited unless it is approved by the European Commission or a successful appeal can be made on the basis of an exception. One of these exceptions is aid for services of general economic interest (“SGEI“). Services of general economic interest SGEIs are economic activities that serve the general interest but cannot usually be offered profitably on the market. State aid is therefore required to be able to offer these services to citizens on the market under the desired conditions or quality. This may concern, for example, social housing or the operation of economically inefficient bus services. Public authorities have a certain degree of discretion in determining which services they qualify as SGEIs. The SGEI Decision The European Commission has developed a number of instruments on the basis of which SGEI aid can be lawfully granted to undertakings. One of these instruments is the SGEI Decision. On the basis of the SGEI Decision, public authorities may compensate undertakings entrusted with the operation of a SGEI for the provision of the SGEI in question, provided that the following conditions are met: The service qualifies as an SGEI; The compensation does not exceed €20 million per year or falls within the other categories of SGEIs covered by the scope of the SGEI Decision in accordance with Article 2(1) of the SGEI Decision; The period for which the undertaking is charged with the SGEI does not exceed 10 years; The amount of compensation does not exceed what is necessary to cover the net costs of implementing the SGEI, including a reasonable profit, i.e., there must be no overcompensation; The undertaking that will perform the SGEI is entrusted with the performance of the SGEI in an entrustment decision setting out the SGEI, the compensation mechanism and other relevant aspects as prescribed in the SGEI Decision; The administrative conditions (control of overcompensation, transparency) are met.   Why revise? The European Commission has conducted an evaluation of (the application of) the ‘old’ SGEI Decision in practice. This has led to the conclusion that the current state aid rules do not provide sufficient guidance for Member States to tackle the housing crisis that the entire European Union is facing. The ‘old’ SGEI Decision was also in need of updating, clarification and simplification of the administrative conditions in certain areas. For these reasons, the European Commission has adopted a revised version of the SGEI Decision, which incorporates experiences from the old decision, economic changes (including the housing crisis) and market developments. The revision is part of the European Commission’s ‘European Plan for Affordable Housing’. SGEI Decision: new vs. old The European Commission has made the following changes to the revised SGEI Decision with regard to the following topics: Increase in compensation ceiling In view of inflation since the entry into force of the ‘old’ SGEI Decision in 2012, the Commission has raised the general compensation ceiling. Based on the revised SGEI Decision, it is possible to grant up to €20 million per year in aid under the general compensation ceiling. Under the “old” SGEI Decision, this ceiling was €15 million. Social and affordable housing as SGEI In order to combat the housing crisis in Europe, the European Commission has further elaborated/relaxed the frameworks for SGEI aid for social housing. It has also added affordable housing as a category of aid. SGEI aid for social and affordable housing is not subject to the general compensation ceiling and may therefore exceed €20 million per year, provided that this does not lead to overcompensation. The European Commission has set out the main definitions and conditions for housing aid in the annex to the revised SGEI Decision. An SGEI in the field of social housing is defined as a service for disadvantaged households or socially disadvantaged groups, including the homeless. SGEIs for affordable housing mainly concern households that are not disadvantaged but which, due to market developments, in particular market failure, do not have access to housing on affordable terms. Examples include first-time buyers, the elderly or single parents. In the annex to the revised SGEI Decision, the Commission sets out, among other things, the following conditions (in addition to the general conditions of the SGEI Decision) that must be met when granting aid for social and/or affordable housing: Quality, environmental and accessibility requirements: social and affordable housing must be of adequate quality and accessibility, comply with environmental standards and be adapted to the needs of households. Duration: in principle, social and affordable housing must be used for that purpose for at least 20 years to prevent subsidised housing from being sold quickly on the commercial market. Eligible costs: the annex contains a broad list of costs that are eligible for coverage by SGEI aid. With regard to affordable housing, requirements are also imposed on the prices charged that can be charged. These must be set in a transparent manner and remain below market prices, but not lower than necessary to achieve the objective pursued. The dwellings in question must also actually be used as affordable housing (and not, for example, as second homes) and the allocation of dwellings must be based on open systems. New/amended aid categories Critical medicines have been added as a possible aid category in the revised DAEB Exemption Decision. The frameworks for airports, air connections, maritime connections with islands and ports have also been amended. Control of overcompensation The European Commission has relaxed the regime with regard to the control of overcompensation. Under the ‘old’ SGEI Decision, control of overcompensation had to take place every three years and at the end of the SGEI. In the revised SGEI Decision, this frequency has been reduced to once every five years. Furthermore, ex post monitoring is no longer required if the beneficiary does not carry out any activities other than the SGEI and is legally obliged to reinvest all profits in the SGEI. Reporting and transparency obligations Under the ‘old’ SGEI Decision, Member States were subject to a biennial reporting obligation. This obligation will be abolished in 2026. Transparency will be ensured from 2028 onwards by means of a registration obligation. From 1 January 2028, all state aid under the SGEI Decision exceeding €1 million per undertaking will have to be registered in a central register within 20 working days of the aid being granted. Entry into force The above changes will enter into force on the twentieth day following the publication of the revised SGEI Decision in the Official Journal of the European Union. Practical impact Although the revised version of the SGEI Decision introduces a large number of changes at first glance, the essence of the decision remains largely the same in practice. The basic principles, such as the requirement for an allocation decision and the prohibition of overcompensation, remain in full force. These basic principles are supplemented by concrete guidelines that public authorities can use to tackle the housing shortage in a more flexible and efficient manner. The practical implications are currently limited to incorporating the new frameworks for social and affordable housing when granting support to this type of SGEI. Governments will be relieved of the biennial reporting obligation and will need to check for overcompensation less frequently. As of 1 January 2028, aid providers will be required to register aid grants exceeding €1 million per undertaking per SGEI in a central register. The extent to which these changes will solve the housing crisis remains to be seen in practice. Contact Do you have any questions about this topic? Or do you have other questions about state aid law? Please feel free to contact Monika Beck or one of our other state aid specialists.

Until 31 July 2025, the European Commission is organising a consultation on the revision of the state aid rules for Services of General Economic Interest (“SGEI”). In this consultation, the European Commission wishes to gather information from the market on the application of the SGEI rules and possible areas for improvement. This consultation is particularly relevant for public bodies, social housing providers and developers involved in housing projects and the delivery of affordable housing, as they are regularly constrained regarding the possibility of public funding for these projects. The European Commission wishes to adjust the SGEI rules accordingly, so that more housing projects can be realised within the frameworks of state aid law. What are the SGEI state aid rules? The SGEI rules provide a legal framework within which governments may grant state aid to organisations that perform services of general economic interest. These are services considered of general interest within society but which are usually not profitable, such as the realisation of social housing. The aim is to ensure that such aid does not lead to unfair competition within the European single market. The rules define the conditions and the amount of aid that may be granted without prior approval from the European Commission. Why this SGEI rules review? The European Commission sees a need to modernise the rules, partly because of the ongoing housing crisis across the EU. With the revision, the Commission wants to make it simpler and faster for member states to provide support for affordable and energy-efficient housing. Some technical adjustments are also proposed to improve the application of the rules. Your input sought The consultation offers government bodies and other stakeholders an opportunity to share their experiences and wishes. This is the time to raise practical bottlenecks and contribute ideas on the future of state aid for housing. Practical information Period: 5 June – 31 July 2025 Location: online Does your organisation deal with housing projects and state aid? Take part in the consultation by answering the questionnaire and contribute to better rules for affordable housing! If you would like assistance with this, or if you have other state aid questions, please do not hesitate to contact Monika Beck or one of our other specialists.

The Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) has recently issued a clear call to companies in the food sector: review and improve your sustainability claims. This call is not optional. The ACM emphasizes that it will actively monitor compliance with the rules and, if necessary, take enforcement action. What does this mean for companies in the food sector? Why this call? Sustainability claims are playing an increasingly significant role in the marketing of food products. Consumers want to make informed choices and consider sustainability in their purchasing decisions. However, the ACM has observed that many claims in the food sector are unclear. This not only undermines consumer trust but can also lead to unfair competition among companies. For example, the ACM notes that it is often unclear what labels, logos, and certifications represent or what a sustainability claim specifically entails. The ACM has previously scrutinized sustainability claims in other sectors, such as clothing, energy, and transportation. Now, it is the food sector’s turn. The Sustainability Claims Guidelines: the basis for compliance The ACM directs companies to its updated Sustainability Claims Guidelines (2023). These guidelines outline five key rules that sustainability claims must adhere to: Use clear, specific, and complete sustainability claims; Substantiate sustainability claims with facts and keep them up to date; Make fair comparisons with other products or competitors; Describe future sustainability ambitions in concrete and measurable terms; Ensure that visual claims and certifications are helpful and not misleading. What’s at stake? The ACM has announced that it will actively check whether companies have adjusted their sustainability claims following this call. If claims do not comply, the ACM has stated that it may take enforcement action. Companies using sustainability claims that do not meet the Sustainability Claims Guidelines may face fines or orders subject to penalty payments. What can your company do? To avoid risks and ensure compliance with the law, it is essential for companies to take action now. A few practical tips: Inventory Your Sustainability Claims. Map out all the claims you use on products, in advertisements, and in stores; Assess Your Claims Against the Sustainability Claims Guidelines. Verify whether your claims comply with the ACM’s five key rules as outlined in the Sustainability Claims Guidelines; Collaborate with Experts. Have your claims reviewed both legally and substantively by specialists. This can help identify and mitigate risks; Communicate Transparently. Ensure that your claims are understandable to consumers and supported by clear information; Stay Up-to-Date. Closely monitor developments in laws and regulations regarding sustainability claims. Conclusion The ACM’s call is a clear warning to the food sector: ensure that your sustainability claims are honest, clear, and substantiated. If not, the ACM may proceed with enforcement. Do you need assistance in reviewing or adjusting your sustainability claims? We are happy to help you mitigate risks and bring your claims into compliance with the law. Feel free to contact Arnout Koeman or one of our other specialists.